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* Probabilistic Risk Assessment is a tool that can inform 
decisions during the entire lifecycle of a programlproject 
- Risk analysis of decision alternatives in light of 
programmatic objectives (to support direction setting 
decisions) 
- Risk analysis of selected alternatives to set priorities (to 
support risk management decisions) 
* Probabilistic Risk Assessment can play a major role in 
- Design decisions and 
- Operation decisions 
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A Typicail Risk Management Process 
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A Typical Risk Management (RM) Process 
Identify - Identify program risk "issues" 
Analyze - Estimate the likelihood and 
consequence components of the risk issues 
Plan - Plan the Track and Control actions 
Track - Track and compile the necessary risk 
data, measuring how the RM process is 
progressing 
Control - Determine the appropriate Control 
action, execute the decision linked to that action, 
and verify its effectiveness 
Communicate and Document -communicating 
and documenting all risk information throughout 
each program phase 
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A Typical Risk Management Process (Cont.) 
Relies heavily on the application of risk matrices 
Risk "issues" are mapped onto the matrix individually 
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Origin of Risk Matrix 
/. Red >> High Risk 
- 
/"11gir~ >> Medium Risk 
Green >> Low Risk 
Risk Matrix Derived from lso-Risk 
Iso-Risk (Equal Risk) Curves 
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Curves 
Cautionary Notes on the Use of Risk Matrix 
A tool for communicating among cognizant and responsible entities 
Presents summary information about the results of an analysis or 
assessment of particular risks, and places those results in the 
context of previously established action thresholds 
The purpose of this communication is to coordinate the 
organizational risk management response 
- Which risks most urgently need management attention? 
- What risks are being elevated? 
- What risks are under control? 
The risk matrix does not add new technical content to the discussion 
that should occur anyway. It only provides a familiar vehicle for 
conveying that content. : it is a tool that 
promotes efficiency in communication. 
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Cautianary Notes on the Use of Risk Matrix 
(Cont.) 
Risks are displayed on a risk matrix in order to frame a discussion of 
the appropriate current risk management response to those risks 
* Traditionally, this has been done by color-coding the cells of the risk 
matrix, with "red" calling for significant attention, "green" implying 
that things are under control, and ' in between. 
* The thresholds separating different-colored regions are necessarily 
specific to programs and organizations 
- Risk tolerance is different among different programs 
- Priorities are different among different programs 
Therefore, the likelihood and consequence scales must be specific to 
the organizational and program context in which a given risk matrix is 
being used 
- They must be defined unambigously 
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Risk-Informing Decisions Making 
(Based o n  NPR 84%00,4A) 
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History of "'Risk-Informed" 
Evolved in the mid-1990's at Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission in the context of nuclear plant [safety] 
risk 
Formulation of "risk-informed" may have been a 
reaction to overzealous advocacy of risk-based 
regulation: aggressively modifying [admittedly 
inefficient] traditional approaches to regulation, 
based on risk model results 
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What is Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM)? 
A risk-informed decision-making process that uses a diverse 
set OF pedormaurce measures (some of which are model-based 
risk metrics) along with other considerations within a 
deliberative process to inform decision making. Paragraph A.14 
of NASA NPR 8000.4A 
Note to Paragraph A. 14: A decision-making process relying primarily on 
a narrow set of model-based risk metrics would be considered "risk- 
based. " 
Decisions are informed by an irstegpaled risk perspective 
rather than being informed by a set of individual "risk" 
contributions whose cumulative significance is not 
understood 
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How Does RlDM Help? 
RIDM is a structured process aimed at achieving success by proactively 
risk-informing the selection of decision alternatives. 
RIDM tries to foster development of the most robust technical basis for 
decision-making 
- Couples the attributes of the proposed decision alternatives to the objectives 
that define success; 
- Considers all attributes of significance to the stakeholders in an integrated 
manner: technical, safety, schedule and cost; 
- Helps ensure that a broad spectrum of decision alternatives are considered; 
- Involves quantitative assessment of the merits and drawbacks of each 
proposed decision alternative relative to the stated objectives; 
- Accounts for the uncertainties inherent to each proposed decision alternative 
to the extent that they impact the achievement of the stated objectives; and 
- Communicates the quantitative assessment of the proposed decision 
alternatives into the decision environment, where it is deliberated along with 
other considerations to form a comprehensive, risk-informed basis for 
alternative selection 
Deliberative process intended to capitalize on tacit organizational 
knowledge after the analysis 1 modeling stage 
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The latest version of NPR 8000.4A, Agency Risk Management 
Procedural Requirements, was issued on December 16,2008 
- Accessible from NASA Online Directives System (NODIS) Library 
- htt 
-
This directive evolves NASA's Risk Management (RM) approach to 
entail two complementary processes: 
- Risk-informed Decision Making (RIDM) 
. Emphasizes the proper use of risk analysis in its broadest sense to make risk informed 
decisions that impact all mission execution domains (e.g., safety, technical, cost, and 
schedule) 
. Formulates recommendations for performance requirements 
- Continuous Risk Management (CRM) 
Focuses on the management of risk associated with implementation of baseline 
performance reauirements 
The WIDM Process 
- identification of decision alternatives 
(decision context) and considering a 
sufficient number and diversity of 
Performance Measures 
- Risk analysis of decision alternatives 
(uncertainty analysis of performance 
associated with the alternative 
- Selection of a decision alternative 
informed by (not solely based on) Risk 
Analysis Results 
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The Continuous Risk Management (CRM) 
Process 
f CRM is conducted in the Steps in the CRM Process 
context of performance 
i requirements ldent~fv 
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Key Terms and Concepts imps~ant  ts RIDM 
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Pedormance Measures and Pedormance Objectives 
A Performance Measure is a metric used to quantify the extent to which 
a Performance Objective is fulfilled 
- Safety (e.g., avoidance of injury, fatality, or destruction of key assets) 
- Technical (e.g., increase thrust or output, maximize amount of observational data 
acquired) 
- Cost (e.g., execution within minimum cost) 
- Schedule (e.g., meeting milestones) 
Examples of Performance Objectives and corresponding Performance 
Measures 
- Maintain Astronaut Health 3 Probability of Loss of Crew (P(L0C)) 
- Minimize Cost + Cost ($) 
- Maximize Payload Capability 3 Payload Capability (kg) 
- Maximize Public Support + Public Support (1 - 5) 
* An Imposed Constraint is a limit on the allowable values of the 
Performance Measure with which it is associated 
- Example: A hard limit on minimum acceptable payload capability 
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Definition of Risk 
The term "risk", when used without further qualifications, is very 
general and applies to a large variety of user contexts 
* In general, risk is uncertainty regarding the future outcome of an 
undertaking of some kind: a decision alternative, a project, a launch, 
etc. 
* In the context of mission execution, risk is the expression sf the 
potentiall for pedormance shortfalls, which may be realized in the 
future, with respect to achieving explicitly, established and stated 
performance requirements 
- The performance shortfalls may be related to any one or more of 
the following mission execution domains: 
Safety 
Technical performance 
Cost 
Schedule 
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Pedormance C9amrnitmeksrt and its Relationship to Risk 
A pe~ormance commitment is a performance measure value 
set at a specified percentile of the performance measure's pdf 
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Operational Definition of Risk 
The "triplet" concept of "risk" is operationally useful for 
defining, analyzing, and managing risk 
--- The seenario$"s) leading to degraded performance with 
respect to one or more Performance Measures (e.g., 
scenarios leading to injury, fatality, destruction of key 
assets; scenarios leading to exceedance of mass limits; 
scenarios leading to cost overruns; scenarios leading to 
schedule slippage); 
--- The !ike\ihood(s) of those scenario(s); and 
-- The consequence$s) (severity of the performance 
degradation) that would result if the scenario(s) was (were) 
to occur 
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The RBDM Process 
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RIDM Process Steps 
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RlDM Process - Step 1 
Derive Pedormasrrsce Measures from Objectives 
In general, it can be difficult to assess decision alternatives against multifaceted 
andlor qualitative top-level objectives 
To deal with this situation, objectives are decomposed, using an ~=rbjec$ive)s 
hierarchy (OH), into a set of lower-level pedosmance objectives that any attractive 
alternative should have 
A pedormasece measure is then developed for each performance objective, as the 
quantity that measures the extent to which a decision alternative meets the 
performance objective 
TopLevel 
Objectives 
Mission 
Execution 
Domains: 
Quantifiable 
Performance 
Notional Objectives Hierarchy 
RlDM Process -- Step 1 
Derive Pedorrnance Measures from Objectives (cant,) 
Objectives are decomposed 
into quantifiable Performance 
Measures 
Some Performance Measures 
may have Imposed Constraints 
Some Performance Measures 
are unconstrained but have a 
desirable direction of 
goodness Performance Objecttves 
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RlDM Process - Step 1 
- 
How is OW DiHerent from Means Objectives? 
Objectives Hierarchy 
Explain what is meant by 
the higher-level objective 
Partition the higher-level 
objective into its constituent 
parts 
Don't impose a solution; 
* Are structured in a hierarchy 
Means Objectives Network 
1 Maximize 1 
Minimize Serious 
Loss of Life Minor Injuries 
Children Children 
(Fundamental) Objectives Hierarchy 
Maximize 
Maximize Use of Minimize 
Vehicle-Safety Features Accidents 
Motivate Purchase of Maintain Vehicles Maximize Driving 
Are Ways of accomplishing vehicle-safety / Features /aNQualit~\ 
hig her-level objectives 
Require Safety Educate Pubiic Enforce Have Reasonable Minimize Driving under 
* May relate to multiple about Safety Traffic Laws Traffic Laws influence of AICO~OI 
hig her-level objectives; Means Objectives Network 
* Imply a solution; 
Are structured in a network 
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RlDM Process - Step 1 
Compiling Alternatives 
Alternative design solutions 
are generated as part of the 
Systems Engineering 
process 
Low-fidelity feasibility 
assessment (e.g., first-order 
analysis, engineering 
judgment) is used to prune the 
trade tree and narrow the set 
of alternatives to analyze 
further 
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RlDM Process - Step 2 
Risk Analysis of Aiternatives 
Goal: to develop a risk analysis framework that integrates domain-specific 
performance assessments and quantifies the performance measures 
- Risk Analvsis - probabilistic modeling of performance 
Uncertain Conditions 
' ~ ,  ,..~ ~~ . . ,' 
Performance Measure n } 
. . . . .X.l..' 
" Peiformance measures depicted for a s,ngle aiteinahve 
* The challenge is to establish a transparent framework that: 
- Operates on a common set of pedcsrmance parameters for each alternative 
- Consistently addresses uncertainties across mission execution domains and across 
alternatives 
- Preserves correlations between performance measures 
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RIDM Process - Step 2 
Risk Anaiysis of Alternatives (cant.) 
Setting the risk analysis framework (alternative specific) 
Presented by Homayoon Dezluli, Ph.D. 
Credit: See the acknowiedgment statement on the first page 
RlDM Process - Step 2 
Risk Analysis of Alternatives (cant.) 
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RlDM Process - Step 2 
Choosing the analysis methodologies 
* Detailed domain-specific analysis guidance is available in domain- 
specific guidance documents like the NASA Cast Esgmatiing 
Handbook, the NASA Systems Engineering HaneS&rao&, and the 
NASA Prababiiiskir"~ Risk Assessment Procedures G ~ l d e  
Depending on project scale, life cycle phase, etc., different levels of 
analysis are appropriate. The rigor of analysis should be enough to: 
- Assess compliance with imposed constraints 
- Distinguish between alternatives 
Iteration is to be expected as part of the analysis process, as 
analyses are refined and additional issues are raised during 
deli berations 
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RlDM Process - Step 3 
Comparing Alternatives in f i rms  of Candidate Pedormance 
Commitments 
Performance Commitments 
- A pedormance commitmen2: is a performance measure value set at a 
specified percentile of the performance measure's pdf 
- Performance commitments help to anchor the decision-maker's 
perspective to specific performance expectations for each alternative 
- For a given performance measure, the performance commitment is set 
at the same percentile for all decision alternatives 
- Performance commitments support 
a risk-raormaliized comparison of 
decision alternatives, at a level of 
risk tolerance determined by the 
decision maker 
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RlDM Process - Step 3 
- 
Develop Risk-Normalized Candidate PeriFormaitlice Commitments 
c..----- ~ ..-a.-. <--- -- - 
(Risk Analysis is Conducted ( Set PM Ordering and I 1 Candidate Performance Commitments 
1 on Alternatives A, B and C , bandidate PM Risk ~olerance4 -*I defined at Candidate PM Risk Tolerances 
\ ~ d 
--.-- - ., L. 
-.^ - -l.m-.l__-.-. 
Candidate Pedormance Commitmen&rs facilitate comparison of performance 
across a range of risk tolerances 
Alternative 
A 
Alternative 
B 
Imposed 
Constraint 
Candidate PM Risk Tolerances I High 1 Moderate I Low 
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WIIDM Process --. B a ~  3 
Performance Commitments are to be Developed in a Conditional 
Fashion 
Pres 
Cred 
PMI Risk 
Tolerance 
A 
Bad/ . -- * 
s. Risk andfysrs ewfpuf fcrA/iem&five i 
PM2 -, 
Peifurmance 
(. P/WZ Rfsk 
I Toierance 
Commitment 
Gaod Bad 
Comm~tmsnl 
GZ. P& ~Yf~rmC?r l~e  C ~ f f ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ f  Set St the 
SpecltTe@ risk t#/ermcb? gtvcnt cumplian~e 
with PMi peflurmnce comm 
Good 
Good Bad 
Performrsnce 
Cornn7~tment 
6. PM, peflor~nce cmmttmenr 
set Bi the specified risk to/ersffce 
Good 
Good PM, -k--Td 
Performance 
Cofl7mffmeni 
d Pe&om#ce comm/fmemfs for PIWJ 
and !?Ma given the specifled PM risk 
tofemncee and PM omfermg 
RBBM Prseess - Pae 3 
Summay of HOW the Concept of Pedormance Commitment 
Works 
The inputs to performance commitment development are 
- The performance measure pdfs for each decision alternative 
- An ordering of the performance measures 
- A risk tolerance for each performance measure, expressed as a 
percentile value 
The decision alternatives are compared by the decision maker in terms 
of candidate performance commitments that have the same failure 
probability across alternatives 
- Example ("Low" risk tolerance on previous slide): 
Alternative B is best at the "low" risk tolerance setting (and Alternative 
A does not satisfy the imposed constraint) 
. Alternative A has the best reliability at the "low" setting 
Alternative C has the best Cost & Schedule performance at the "low" 
setting 
The approach focuses DM attention on the level of program risk being 
assumed by selection of a given alternative at given commitment levels 
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Risk-informed Alternative Selection 
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Probabilistic Risk Assessment Overview 
Review sf Same Key Concepts 
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The Concept of a Scenario 
PIVOTAL EVENTS 
The perturbation R Mitigative 
R Aggravating Consequence of interest to decision- 
maker 
A risk scenario contains an IE and (usually) one or more pivotal events 
leading to an undesired end state. 
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An Operational Definition for Risk 
Risk is a set of triplets <Si, Pi, Ci> that 
answer the questions : 
- What can go wrong? (scenarios, Si) 
- How likely is it? (probabilities, Pi) 
- What are the consequences? (adverse 
effects, Ci) 
Kaplan 6: Garrick, Risk Analysis. 1987 
R = RISK = f ( S,, Pi, Ci ) j 
RISK 
Scenario 
Sl 
S* 
553 
SN 
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Probability 
PI 
P2 
P3 
PN 
Consequence 
Cl 
c2 
c3 
CN 
Hazard $ Risk 
Examples of Hazard and Risk 
- Hazard: Hydrazine is a hazard because it can result or 
contribute to loss of spacecraft 
- Risk: The risk scenario of CHydrazine Beakage AND not 
defecting the Beakage damaging fright cri 
avionics> has probability af 1 in 10,OgDgd to result in a Boss 
of spacecraft 
Presented by Homayoon Dezfuli, 
Credit: See the acknowledgment statement on the first page 
Pivotal Events 
In between IE and end states 
- Represent Hydrazine leaks =d 
. successes or failures of Leak is not isolated gd 
systemlcrew responses to 
the IE Damage to flight critical avionics 
occurrence or non- 
occurrence of external 
conditions or phenomena 
- Mitigative: reduces the 
severity of a consequence 
Events 2 and 3 
are Plvotal 
- Aggravating: increases the 
Loss of : 
a 
severitv of a conseauence 
- 
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More on the Concept of Risk Scenarios 
A risk scenario is in effect a conditional statement. 
It is a logical expression that has the following structure: 
Occurrence of certain event(s) + undesired end state 
8F (IE n Pivotal Event 1 n Pivotal Event 2 n ..), THEN undesired end 
state is reached 
Where , I-, for "and" 
A risk scenario is often characterized by a minimum set of events. In 
this case, the undesired end state can be prevented if 
- the IE does not occur :or> 
- one or more pivotal events do not occur 
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The '"vent" Concept 
Events: Building blocks of a scenario 
- declarative sentences used to characterize a scenario 
* Each event is a statement about a piece of equipment, a function, a 
condition, an outcome, etc. 
- It is binary: Can only have two mutually-exclusive states (True or 
False). 
- Example: 
Leak is not detected 
(Failure Space) 
Leak is detected 
Leak is detected 
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PRA Ovewiew 
PRA Methodology Synopsis 
Prese 
Credit 

Decision Context 
If the PRA model is to be used to support decision making, then it 
should be structured to suit this purpose 
The performance measures (PMs) are defined according to decisions 
being supported 
Identification of PMs is the starting point of the PRA process 
- They should serve the evaluation of decision options 
- Ultimately they should be quantified 
Examples of PMs: 
- P(loss of life or injury / illness to crew) 
- P(damage to, or loss of, equipment or property) 
- P(evacuation) 
- P(failure of mission) 
- P(damage to environment) 
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Scenario Structuring 
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System Familiarization 
Development of a comprehensive scenario set for a complex facility 
or mission is a team effort because of 
- the volume of work and 
- diversity of technicall discipline involved 
* PRA requires detailed knowledge of responses to perturbations 
* PRA analysts require an in-depth knowledge of the system and how it 
operates. 
- knowledge of system dependencies; 
- knowledge of system operability states 
* Knowledge of "How it Fails" is derived from 'How it Works" 
* PRA team should include system experts 
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Initiating Events (IEs) 
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Master Logic Diagram (MLD) 
Hierarchical (Top-Down) method for obtaining initiating event groups 
(CLASS OF THINGS THAT CAN GO WRONG?) 
The highest level of hierarchy is the end state of interest 
Intermediate levels identify systems and subsystems (e.g., thruster 
module fails) 
Lower levels identify component assemblies and initiating event 
categories (e.g., filter clogs or propellant leaks) 
Master Logic Diagram is completed when further breakdown 
produces same system responses as higher level 
An important consideration in the development of a useful MLD is 
knowing when to stop at a reasonable level 
* The "pinch point" occurs when every level below the stopping level 
has the same consequence as the level above it 
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Initialing Events: Master Logic Diagram (MLD) 
Funct ion , El 
I , \  
End State , 
, , 
Funct ion m 
control) 
- "  
Highest L e v e l  of I 
Hierarchy 
x - 
1 
- 1 1  
L e v e l  1 
Function 
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Group as an IE Category 
if Produce the s a m e  
system r e s p o n ~ e  
Event Sequence Diagram (ESD) 
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Structuring Scenarios 
ESD is useful for identifying accident scenarios 
The method uses forward logic 
An ESD is developed for each initiating event category in the Master 
Logic Diagram 
Most engineers find ESDs intuitive and easy to understand: 
- Used for communication between PRA analysts and system 
engineers 
Events may be ordered to reflect dependence: 
- Later events depend on earlier events 
Similarities in system response indicate that different initiating events 
can be combined 
Scenario modeling is not typically accomplished in a single pass 
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A Typical ESD 
False 
(no) 
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A Simple Example 
The spacecraft is designed with two redundant sets 
of thrusters (independent of each other) 
0 Each propellant distribution module consists of a 
hydrazine tank, filters, distribution lines, normally- 
open isolation valves, sensors, heaters, etc. (only 
components that affect mitigation of leaks are 
shown) 
When thruster operation is needed, the controller 
opens the solenoid valves (not shown) to allow to one set of 
hydrazine to flow 
* The controller monitors the pressure of feed-lines 
via pressure transducers (PI and P2). It is 
designed to differentiate between the normal 
thruster operation and a leak 
In the event of a leak, isolation valves (V1 and V2) 
should both close Simpi88ied Schematic sf Propellapat 
Successful termination of the leak leads to the loss Distribution Module 
of one but not both, thruster sets 
Failure to terminate the leak can cause damage to 
the flight critical avionics andlor damage to 
scientific equipment: 
* Hydrazine acts as a wire stripper and is 
corrosive 
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ESD for Propellant Leak 
------___ 
I  IE Event I  
1 - - - -____ I  
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
I 
, 
4 Pivo 
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, 
---- .&- - -  I An End State ; 
-- - - - - -_ I  
Constructing Event Trees for Propellant Leak 
NO damage to No damage to 
Hydrazine leaks Leak detected Leak isolated flight critical scientific End state 
avionics equipment 
no 
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Fault Tree Symbols (Basic Events) 
PRIMARY EVENT SYMBOLS I 
BASIC EVENT - A basic initiating fault requiring no further development 
CONDITIONING EVENT - Specific conditions or restrictions that apply to 
0 any logic gate (used primarily with PRIORITY, AND and INHIBIT gates). 
UNDEVELOPED EVENT -An event which is not further developed either 
because it is of insufficient consequence or because information is unavailable. 
HOUSE EVENT -An event which is normally expected to occur. 
P r e s e w ,  n 
Credlt See the acknowiedgment statement on the first page 
Fault Tree Symbols (Transfers) 
TRANSFER SYMBOLS 
TRANSFER IN - Indicates that the next tree is developed further at the occurrence of the 
corresponding TRANSFER OUT (e.g. on another page) 
TRANSFER OUT - Indicates that this portion of the tree must be attached at the 
corresponding TRANSFER IN 
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Fault Tree Symbols (Gates) 
GATE SYMBOLS 
AND - Output fault occurs if all of the input faults occur. 
OR - Output fault occurs if at least one of the input faults occur. 
EXCLUSIVE OR - Output fault occurs if exactly one of the input faults 
PRIORITY AND - Output fault. occurs if all of the input faults occur in a 
specific sequence. The sequence is represented by a CONDlTIONING 
EVENT drawn to the right of the gate. 
INHIBIT - Output fault occurs if the (single) input fault occurs in the 
presence of an enabling condition. The enabling condition is represented by a 
CONl3lTIONING EVENT drawn to the right of the gate. 
Presented by Homayoon Dezful!, Ph D 
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Fault Tree Modeling of Pivotal Events (Cont.) 
I 
pm model embodies a 
of various models (logic, reliability, 
simulation and physical, etc.) in an 
integrated structure 
Presented by Homayoon Dezfuli, P~ .D .  
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The Concept of Cut Sets 
The primary reason for logic-based decomposition of IEs or pivotal 
events into more detailed causal events (primary events) is the 
identification of cut sets 
* Cut set: A set of primary events whose simultaneous occurrence 
guarantees the occurrence of the top event (pivotal event) 
* Minimal cut set: A cut set containing the minimum subset of primary 
elements whose simultaneous occurrence guarantees the occurrence 
of the top event 
- If one were to remove one of the events in a minimal cut set, the 
top event would not occur 
Presented by Homayoon Deztuli, Ph.D. 
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Min Cut Sets for Pivotal Event (Leak not 
Leaknot detected TRUE or ~~t~~ 
x 
True 
pressure 
transducer 2 
fa,& 
P2 
CN P1 
commoncause 
failure of P 
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x 
True 
Let "'T'symbolize "Leak not 
detected" 
The minimal cut sets for event T 
How to read it: 
T occurs IF { CN occurs OR PP 
occurs OR P% and P2 both occur} 
Examples of Rules of Boolean Algebra 
A n A  
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Minimal Cut Sets for Pivotal Event (Leak not 
Detected) 
G2 = P I  n P2 
G I  = C N u P P u G 2  
G I  = CN u PP u (PI n P2) 
Minimal cut sets 
CN u PP u (PInP2) 
Presented by Homayoon Dezfuli. Ph.0. 
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Minimal Cut Sets for Pivotal Event (Leak not 
isolated) 
GI1 = L u G12 
G12 = IL n GI3 
G13=V1 u V 2 u C N  
G12 = IL n (Vl u V2 u CN) 
G12 = (IL n V1) u (IL n V2) u (IL n CN) 
GI1 = L u (IL n Vl)  u (IL n V2) u (IL n CN) 
Minimal cut sets 
L u (/L n Vzd) u {BL n V2) u (IE n CN) 
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One-to-Many Mapping of Scenarios 3, 6, and 9 
- 
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Conditional Events 
intuitively the 
likelihood of /A1 
should be smaller 
than /A2 
Hydrazine leaks 
IE 
- 
1 
2 
_ _ - -  
---- 
3 
4 
/AZ=Avionics fail aft 5 
6 
7 
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\mx\-- -. - 
Leak detected 
LD 
Leak isolated 
LI 
No damage to 
flight critical 
avionics 
A 
No damage to 
scientific 
equipment 
S 
> 
End state 
Probabilistic Modeling 
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Type of Events that Appear in the Structure of 
Scenarios 
Hardware failure: failure mode(s) of hardware components 
- Example: isolation valve fails to close on demand 
* Software failure 
- Example: controller program fails to generate isolation signal due 
to a software error 
Phenomenological: a sequence of physical, chemical or biological 
events 
- Example: Propellant Leak damages critical wire harnesses for 
avionics 
* Human error: omission or commission errors 
- Example: Crew fails to isolate the leak after automatic isolation 
fails 
Common cause failure (CCF): Failure of multiple components due to 
common physical environment or human interaction 
- Example : common cause failure of both pressure transducers 
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Data Development 
Events appear in the structure of scenarios are treated as uncertain 
quantities for which we need probability estimates. Sources of data: 
- Hardware 
Historical data on a similar piece of equipment 
General engineering knowledge about the equipment or an 
expert's experience with the equipment 
- Phenomenological 
Experimental and simulation models 
Expert judgment 
- Human error 
Simulator data 
Actuarial data 
Expert judgement 
- Common cause failure 
Parametric models (e.g., beta factor) 
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Use of Reliability Models to obtain Probability 
Estimates (an example) 
The simplest and widely-used model based on the assumption of exponential 
time-to-failure 
* Probability of failure: 
Example: assume h = 0.001 per hour Er, I 
1 
the probability that the device will fail 
before t=1000 hours is 0.8 
1- exp(-1)=0.632 
0.6 
the probability that the device works for 0.4 
at least 1000 hours is 
1 - 0.632z0.368 0.2 
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Uncertainty Expressed as Probability 
Distribution 
Failure Rate (Uncertain Variable) 
Lagnormat Distribution 
X r= 00024005 
1 5  0 0 5  1 1 5  2 2 ' 15 4 
Faalure Rate (Valuesx IEJ) 
Typical uncertainties are associated with 
Numerical values of the parameters used in the model 
Inherent variability of stochastic processes 
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Bayes' Theorem 
The types of information available for the frequency of basic events 
include: 
- prior knowledge such as general engineering knowledge and the 
historical information from similar events, 
- the observed data for the event of interest in the system under 
study 
The Bayesian approach provides a formal mechanism for combing ali 
available information, such as engineering and qualification test data, 
filed experience, expert judgment, and data from similar systems 
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Bayes' Theorem (cont.) 
Our prior knowledge about 
the failure rate 
Failure Rate 
Model: Poisson 
Evidence: K failures in t hours of operation 
K-2; t=1000 hours 
(evidence E) 
j2o (21 L(E]A> I 
- 1 Use Bayes' Theorem to k 
' - -  - J combine our prior knowledge 
and our evidence 
r 
Comparison of Prior and Posterior 
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B Prior 
8 Posterior 
data 
Failure Rate 
Probability Values Assigned to Basic Events of 
Example Problem 
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Analysis Results for the Example Problem 
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Frequency of Leak Initiated Scenarios that Lead 
to Loss of Vehicle 
Failure, Avionics Failure 
e e d d  but so a 1023 ,a ,  s, 
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Characterizing Frequency of Events as 
U n c e ~ a i n  Quantities 
We are uncertain about the value of 
parameter(s) used to model occurrence We assumed a&! events are 
probability of each event in the right iog-normalily distributed 
Example: We are uncertain about the value of 
the failure rate h that we assumed in the 
exponential failure model of Event "CN" 
We use log normal distribution to characterize 
our uncertainty for hcN 
Because hcN is uncertain, Pr(CN) would 
become uncertain. 
* Each distribution defined in the right 
represents the uncertaintv in the occurrence 
probability of the event as a result of 
uncertainty in the value of a parameter(s) that 
is used to generate the probability 
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UneerZainty Propagation through the Model 
A single 
dlstrlbutlon 
for lE 
CUT SET 1 
CUT SET 2 X X 
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Example of Risk Results 
Probability Distribution for Loss of Vehicle 
(Scenarios 3,6, and 9) 
5th Percentile 1 5.73E-06 
0 OOHOO 1 75E-01 3 50E-01 5 25E-01 7 WE01 
Frequency Values in 10A3 
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Insights 
* One scenario dominates the risk 
- leak occurs upstream of isolation valves. Because it is not 
isolable it can damage critical avionics 
- Contribution to risk: 97% 
* Options to reduce risk 
tank and isoiation valves (e.g., 
of wires and fortify wire 
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Summary of PRA Strengths 
Quantifies performance measures 
- Probability of Loss of Crew (LOC) 
- Probability of Loss of Mission (LOM) 
- PRA metrics are integral risk metrics 
Captures dependences and other relationships between sub-systems 
Works within a scenario-based concept of risk that best informs 
decision-making 
- Identifies contributing elements (initiating events, pivotal events, 
basic events) 
- Quantifies the risk significance of contributing elements, helping 
focus on where improvements will be effective 
- Provides a means of re-allocating analytical priorities according to 
where the dominant risk contributors appear to be coming from 
- Provides a framework for a monitoring 1 trending program to 
detect risk-significant adverse trends in performance 
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Summary of PRA Strengths (cant.) 
Quantifies uncertainty and ranks contributors to uncertainty 
Supports trade studies by quantifying 
- The most goal-related metrics 
- System interfaces and dependencies 
- Responses to system and function challenges 
- Effects of varying performance levels of different systems 
Can be a powerful tool when used to assist decision-making 
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PRA Results of a Real Space System 
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International Space Station (ISS) Critical End 
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PSS Nan-Critical End States 
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